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I. INTRODUCTION 
 EOPLE form relations and these relations constitute a 
network. Within this network people maintain different 
positions, and this is not without consequences. Labor 
market outcomes, job satisfaction, and health outcomes are 
just a few examples of outcomes that are influenced by a 
person’s network position [1]+[4]. Given that network 
positions matter and that people have an idea of the pattern 
of relations between others, it is argued that they try to 
maneuver themselves into optimal positions [5], [6]. It is 
typically neglected that in the complex system that networks 
provide a person’s decisions do not only influence one’s own 
position and outcomes in the network, but also the positions 
and outcomes of others. Experimental evidence indicates that 
people manifest social motives in many decision situations. 
Next to their own outcomes, they take the outcomes of others 
into account [7]. Given that people manifest such motives in 
a wide range of decision situations [8]+[10] and that in a 
network their decisions influences the outcomes of others, 
the question becomes to what extent social motives play a 
role in network formation.  
Applying the assumption of purposive behavior, game+
theoretic models of network formation have been developed 
[11], [12]. These models allow for investigation of stable 
networks and the formation process leading to these 
networks. Experimental tests of the game+theoretic models 
indicate that the models predict well when the outcomes are 
equal for all actors in the predicted networks [13]+[15], but 
that the predicted networks are seldom observed if they 
provide unequal outcomes over actors [13], [14], [16]+[18]. 
Most of the theoretical models to predict network dynamics 
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assume myopic self+interest on the side of the actors. Myopic 
implies that actors do not take into account that their 
decisions influence the incentives of others to invest in 
specific relationships, which likely causes further changes in 
the network. Due to the complexity of interdependencies that 
exists within networks this assumption is difficult to relax. 
Relaxing the assumption of self+interest is less problematic, 
and seems reasonable given that subjects are found to display 
social motives in a wide range of decision situations. 
Therefore, relaxing the assumption of self+interest is the 
dominant approach to explain the experimental findings in 
network experiments [13], [17], [18]. 
Social motives can be operationalized in many different 
ways [19], [20]. A large part of the literature focuses on two 
specific motives, namely, the concern for others absolute 
outcomes, often denoted as a concern for efficiency in the 
economic literature [21], [22], and a concern for equality 
[10], [23]. Past network formation experiments provide 
evidence that both efficiency and equality concerns are of 
importance in network formation. It has been reported that 
subjects are more likely to change relations if efficiency, in 
terms of the sum of outcomes over all actors, is low [18] and 
if networks provide unequal outcomes [13], [18]. Next to 
this, it has been reported that subjects try to minimize their 
disadvantage relative to other subjects in the network [18]. In 
the present paper, we investigate to what extent we can 
understand individual decisions of subjects in a network 
formation experiment by assuming that they are myopic but 
in addition to selfish preferences also have preferences for 
efficiency and equality. These results might differ compared 
to other contexts because the effects of one’s decisions 
during network formation often have heterogeneous effects. 
Creating or deleting a link might increase the payoffs of 
some, while decreasing that of others. Similarly, it may 
increase equality between some actors, while decreasing 
equality between other actors. These inherent complexities in 
network formation can be expected to reduce the salience of 
social motives.  
II. THEORY 
The prominent approach in the literature to construct non+
standard utility models is assuming that actors take the 
outcomes of others’ into account in a specific manner. Kelley 
and Thibaut [24] already provided several ways in which 
actors might make such a transformation, stating that actors 
may try to maximize own outcomes, others’ outcomes, the 
sum of own and others’ outcomes or try to maximize or 
minimize the difference between own and others’ outcomes. 
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This work sparked a large stream of literature on the role of 
social motives. Two forms of these social motives dominate 
the literature. The first is a concern for the absolute 
outcomes of others, or efficiency, next to a concern for own 
outcomes. Starting with [25], this motive has received 
considerable empirical support in the literature. The second 
is a concern for equality, which has received considerable 
attention in the psychological literature on justice and equity 
[26]. Recently, equality arguments have also been applied to 
explain major patterns in data deriving from experiments in 
economics [8], [10]. If we add these two social motives to 
the utility related to one’s own outcome, the utility function 
of an actor i can be written as Ui = Wi1  (Own outcome) + 
Wi2  (Efficiency) + Wi3  (Equality), where Wi1 represents the 
weight given by actor i to the own outcome, Wi2 is the weight 
given by actor i to efficiency and Wi3 is the weight given by 
actor i to equality [23]. While maintaining the assumption 
that actors change links in a myopic way, we can formulate 
the following three hypotheses if actors value all three 
motives positively:  

	
 An actor is more likely to create or maintain a link, the 
more this link increases his or her outcomes in the network;  
	 An actor is more likely to create or maintain a link, the 
more this link increases the efficiency in the network;  
	 An actor is more likely to create or maintain a link, the 
more this link increases equality in the network. 
 
In order to contrast the different motives, we distinguish 
four contexts for which we know that following only selfish 
motives can run against one or both social motives 
distinguished above. We apply a truncated version of the 
connections model as well as the co+author model [11]. 
Using two levels of linking cost for each of the models gives 
us four contexts in total. In both models links are considered 
to be undirected and require consent of both actors involved. 
In other words, actors i and j have to agree to form the link 
between them. We denote the number of direct contacts of 
actor i with ni, and the number of contacts to which actor i is 
not directly but indirectly connected through one 
intermediate contact with n2i.  
We start with the connections model truncated at distance 
2 with low linking cost [11]. We denote the value of a direct 
contact by α, the value of an indirect contact at distance two 
by β, and the linking cost by c. The payoff pi(g) of actor i is 
given by 2 2( ) ( )α β α β= ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ = − ⋅ + ⋅i i i i i ip g n n c n c n n . 
We use β > α − c > 0 (specifically, α − c = 1	and	β = 5) for 
the first experimental condition. We term this condition 
where “low” indicates the relatively low linking 
cost. In this condition, a self+interested actor prefers to 
connect to actors who have many relationships. By 
connecting to an actor with many links, one gains valuable 
indirect contacts. Such behavior is also beneficial for the 
group as a whole; the star network not only being consistent 
with selfish utility maximization, but also being the efficient 
network in this condition [11]. Equality, however, is low in 
the star network because in centralized networks the central 
actors are considerably worse off than the less central actors. 
Therefore, although one would expect star networks in this 
context under purely selfish motives (possible supplemented 
with efficiency motives), equality preferences can prevent 
actors from reaching these star networks. 
In the second connections model condition, β > 0 > α − c 
(specifically, α − c = −1	and	β = 5). We term this condition 
		. In this condition, a self+interested actor still 
wants to connect to actors who have many connections in 
order to maximize the number of indirect contacts. Now, 
however, actors no longer benefit from direct connections 
and (assuming myopic self+interest) structures as the star, 
which is still the most efficient network, are not anymore 
stable for self+interested actors. The reason is that the central 
actor in the star is not anymore prepared to keep the links. 
Therefore, we expect to end up in more equal networks if 
actors are self+interested, and the contrast between own 
outcomes and equality decreases. On the other hand, a 
contrast between own outcomes and efficiency arises. If an 
actor attaches a high value to efficiency he or she might be 
willing to take a central position, even though this causes 
negative own outcomes and pronounced inequality. Note 
that, starting from an empty network, purely myopic self+
interested actors will not initiate any links. In this sense, the 
empty network is stable. Other stable networks are networks 
in which each actor has at least two links, and are thus 
characterized by circle shaped structures [11].  
In the co+author model [11], there are, opposite to the 
connections model, negative externalities from links others 
have. The payoff pi(g) of actor i in the co+author model is 
given by  
| 1 | 1
1 1 1 1 1
( ) 1 1
≠ = ≠ =
   = + + − = − ⋅ + + ⋅  ⋅   
∑ ∑i i
i j i j i ji j ij i j ij
p g c n c
n n n n n n
 
if ni > 0 and pi(g) = 0 if ni = 0. Here, ij indicates that there is 
a link between actors i and j.
 
The payoff shows that the 
added value for i of a link with j decreases with the number 
of links j has. 
In the first co+author condition, we set linking cost c = 0. 
We term this condition  As is shown in [11], the 
network that maximizes the sum of group outcomes consists 
of separate pairs of connected actors if the number of actors 
is even. In the case of an uneven number of actors the 
optimal network consists of a three+actor line and separate 
dyads between the remaining actors. The network formation 
process resemblance a prisoners’ dilemma or public good 
game; i.e., it is in the interest of the ego that alter does not 
create more partnerships, and collectively it is best if no 
actor builds more than one link. Each actor, however, has the 
incentive to create more links. Because each actor has the 
incentive to create as much links as possible, the situation 
will cascade towards the complete network, which makes 
everybody worse of in the long run. So although the network 
with all separate dyads is efficient and equal, it is not in 
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correspondence with myopic self+interest. Adding additional 
links in the network decreases efficiency faster than that own 
outcomes of the actors involved increase. If actors value 
efficiency, this might facilitate the formation of mutually 
exclusive dyads, and thereby resolve the social dilemma.
In the second co+author condition, we set c = 0.3, and term 
this condition 		. In this case the efficient and 
equal structure of mutually exclusive dyads is stable. 
Simulations in which actors, in a random order, were allowed 
to add and remove links indicated, however, that under 
myopic self+interest it is very unlikely that people actually 
reach dyads in large groups. The reason is that there are 
other inefficient stable networks that might be reached 
because in the beginning of the process individual actors try 
to become better off than in the dyad by connecting to 
multiple others. 
III. EXPERIMENT 
In order to test our hypotheses we ran a computerized 
experiment in which subjects anonymously interacted with a 
given number of other subjects in a “network formation 
game.” Most network formation experiments aim at testing 
macro+level predictions. Since our aim is not on the macro, 
but rather on the micro+level, we diverged from common 
practices within such experiments. First, we allowed subjects 
to change their relations in continuous time with complete 
knowledge about the current links present in the network. 
This was realized by instantaneous updating of all screens as 
soon as a link was changed. Most experiments use a discrete 
time linking protocol that only allows subjects to change 
their entire subset of linking decisions at discrete times, 
without knowing what others are doing [13], [14], [17], [18], 
[27]. It has been reported that such a process causes 
coordination problems [14], [17], which makes this approach 
less optimal for the analysis of individual decisions, because 
individual decisions can be strongly affected by 
unobservable expectations about others’ decisions. 
Second, we decided to calculate and award payoffs in 
continuous time, and also continuously update information 
on these earnings this on the screen. The alternative is to 
calculate payoffs at discrete points in time [14], [15]. In such 
an environment, although subjects continuously make 
decisions, payoffs are only awarded at certain time intervals; 
the position that the subjects maintain at these time points 
determines their payoffs, the positions that they maintain in 
between are basically irrelevant. This method can be 
considered suboptimal when one is interested in individual 
decisions, because there is no direct incentive attached to 
link changes, which is crucial for our analysis of decisions as 
will become clear below. 
Third, we allowed subjects to form networks in larger 
groups than are typically employed. Most experiments use 
groups of between 4 to 6 subjects, while in our experiment 
groups are between 9 and 15 subjects. The reason for is that 
we obtain more individual decisions than we would observe 
in smaller networks, because it is much more difficult for 
subjects to reach a network in which everyone is satisfied 
with the current position. The disadvantage of having fewer 
networks is not that problematic because we do not test 
hypotheses at the macro+level and we control for dependence 
of observations using a multi+level approach. 
Fourth, we conceptualize links as being two+sided. Both 
parties have to agree for a link to form. This makes our 
analysis of individual decisions slightly more complex, 
because there are now two people deciding on the creation of 
a link. Still we decide for this approach because most 
theoretically interesting relations, such as “friendships, co+
authorships in research papers, collaboration between firms 
in R&D, links between buyers and sellers, and free trade 
agreements between nations” [28, p. 199] can be considered 
two+sided. 	
Our experiment was programmed and conducted using z+
Tree [29]. Fig. 1 shows an example of a screen subjects saw 
in this case in the 		 condition. In the experiment, 
subjects were depicted on the screen. Each subject saw him 
or herself depicted as a (blue) hexagon, while he or she saw 
the others depicted as (black) circles. This allowed the 
subjects to clearly distinguish between themselves and the 
other subjects. A subject could propose links and delete 
existing proposals for links by clicking on the other subjects. 
We only considered a link present if both subjects agreed on 
this, a proposal thus had no effect on payoffs; it merely 
provided a way in which a given subject could show another 
subject his or her interest in forming a link. A proposal was 
depicted as a blue directed arrow from the given subject, 
making the proposal, to the other subject. Because proposals 
did not matter in determining actual network position and 
payoffs, a proposal was only visible for the two subjects 
involved. Given that a proposal existed, it was possible for a 
link to form. In a situation in which a given subject had made 
a proposal for a link to another subject, this other subject 
could create the link by clicking on the former subject. A 
link was depicted as a thick double+headed arrow, colored 
blue on the screens of the subjects involved in the link and 
black on the screens of the other subjects.  
In the upper right corner of the screen the amount of 
seconds left in the current network formation round was 
shown. The scenario and round were also stated at the top of 
the screen. The ordering of payoff functions differed 
between sessions because learning effects might occur. The 
scenario corresponded with the explanations of the specific 
payoff functions in the instructions. In the result section we 
investigate whether placing of a payoff function in the 
experiment influences our results. All subjects participated 
for three rounds in all four conditions. First, they participated 
in a trial round in which they could get some experience with 
network formation without it influencing their actual 
monetary payoffs. After this, they played two “real” rounds 
that did affect their monetary payoffs. Trial rounds lasted 90 
seconds while the paid rounds lasted 300 seconds. The 
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information on the scenario and round allowed subjects to 
easily locate where they were in the experiment at any point 
in time. After each round subjects were reshuffled on the 
screen, insuring anonymity between rounds.  
The screen also provided insights in the payoffs that 
subjects earned. While payoffs were calculated per second 
they were shown per minute because the payoffs per second 
were very low. Subjects were clearly explained that payoffs 
were calculated per second and that if, for example, they 
would earn 90 points per minute for 10 seconds they would 
receive 10/60 times 90 = 15 points for these 10 seconds. The 
payoff that a given subject earned per minute was shown at 
the bottom of his or her screen and in his or her blue 
hexagon. The number of points that the other subjects earned 
were shown in the black circles representing these subjects 
on the screen. Next to this, the size of both the hexagon and 
the dots changed with the number of points that the subjects 
earned: larger in size meaning that the particular subject 
earned more points per minute. These shifts in sizes were 
made to allow subjects to take the outcomes for others into 
account in a more intuitive way than looking at their numeric 
outcome. The subjects only saw what they and the others 
were earning individually at that point in time and did not 
see any aggregate measures on sum of outcomes for the 
group or equality of outcomes. 
In total we ran 16 experimental sessions, each of them 
having between 9 and 15 subjects. Subjects were contacted 
using the Online Recruitment System for Economic 
Experiments (ORSEE) [30] to participate in a study called 
“Let’s Connect.” They were offered on average €16 but were 
informed that the exact amount depended on their own and 
others’ decisions. A total of 227 subjects subscribed for one 
of the 16 sessions, of which a total of 205 subjects 
participated. The exact number of subjects in a session was 
partly determined by chance. We tried to get as many 
subscriptions as possible (maximum of 16) and every 
registered subject who showed up in time was allowed to 
participate. The majority of subjects were students at Utrecht 
University from a wide range of different disciplines and 
nationalities, although non+student subjects also participated. 
Subjects were between 17 and 60 (mean age being 21.6), 
68.3% female, and 78.5% Dutch. Complete instructions are 
available from the authors. 
IV. METHODS AND MEASUREMENT 
The network formation experiment generated a 
tremendous amount of data. In total we collected 117,715 
decisions (clicks by subjects on other subjects) made by the 
205 subjects in all network formation rounds. In our analyses 
FIGURE 1 
SCREEN SHOWN DURING THE NETWORK FORMATION EXPERIMENT IN THE 		 CONDITION 
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we neglect all decisions made in the trial rounds and all 
decisions to create or remove proposals, because these 
decisions did not influence actual payoffs. After excluding 
these cases we are left with 67.917 decisions.  
Next to being large in size, the dataset is rather complex. 
Subjects were allowed to create and remove links in 
continuous time. In order to be able to analyze this data 
statistically we impose a number of assumptions to transfer 
the clicks into analyzable decisions. We do not pretend to 
know what subjects are doing if they do not make changes. It 
can be that they are evaluating their relations and actively 
deciding not to do anything; it can also be that they are 
simply distracted. If a subject creates or removes a link, 
however, we assume that this signals that the link is under 
evaluation. Due to the complexity of the game it is unlikely 
that people will calculate the effect of a change for 
themselves and others accurately before clicking. It is much 
easier, and almost without cost, to make the change and 
evaluate whether or not the result is satisfactory.
1
 Therefore, 
we assume that if a change is made in the network, the 
subject(s) involved evaluate the situation with and without 
the link and choose from these two situations the best one 
according to their preferences. By making this assumption 
we can reorganize the data into a series of pairwise 
comparisons.  
If a change leads to an undesirable result, it can be 
reversed immediately. Naturally, such a reversal must be 
made within a short time period after the initial change. If a 
person removes the link multiple seconds or even minutes 
after the initial change, this decision cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as the result of a paired comparison of the 
situation with and without the link, because many other 
changes will probably have happened in between. We, 
therefore, analyze whether or not a change is reversed within 
a short evaluation period, after the initial change. The 
computer program observed time in discrete seconds, so we 
chose the period in which a change could be reversed as 
either being the second in which the change is made or the 
consecutive second. In the result section, we investigate 
whether increasing the length of the evaluation moment 
matters for our results. 
When a subject removes a link, the pairwise comparison 
process and its interpretation are quite straightforward. If a 
subject removes a link and does not reverse this decision this 
indicates that this subject prefers the situation without the 
link to the situation with the link. If a subject removes a link 
and reverses this decision this indicates that the subject 
prefers the situation with the link to the situation without the 
link. 
 
1 This assumption was supported by several short talks with 
subjects, who indicated that they made their decisions on a trial and 
error basis. It also seems reasonable because the blank sheets we 
provided the subjects so that they could make notes did not contain 
any calculations on how specific network positions would transfer 
to outcomes. 
When a subject creates a link, both subjects involved in 
the link can decide to reverse it because mutual consent is 
needed. If the creation of a link is reversed, this indicates 
that the subject that reverses the link prefers the situation 
without the link to the situation with the link. If the link is 
maintained, however, this signals that both subjects involved 
in the link prefer the situation with the link to the situation 
without the link. In our model we cannot add variables for 
both subjects because in all other cases there is only one 
subject who makes the decision. Therefore, we have to 
somehow combine the variables over the two subjects or to 
select one subject as the “crucial” decision maker. We 
decided to take the person who initialized the actual change 
as the crucial decision maker. Given that many changes are 
going on simultaneously on the screen, it is unlikely that the 
subject who did not initialize the change is focused enough 
on this particular change to undo the change quickly enough. 
The subject who initializes the change, on the contrary, will 
immediately notice the change it causes and can be expected 
to undo the change if it is not satisfactory. Alternatively, we 
also considered taking averages on independent variables 
over both players, but this is problematic. A profit of 2 for 
one actor and 0 for the other from a link, would lead to the 
same average as an increase of 102 for the one actor and +
100 for the other from a link. We would, however, expect 
that the latter link is much less likely to be maintained than 
the former, because the actor with +100 would be far less 
likely to maintain the link. Therefore, we investigated 
whether it would matter if we took the person who earned the 
least from the link as the crucial decision maker. In the 
analyses this decision mainly mattered for the connections 
model conditions. We will elaborate on this after the 
discussion of the main results. 
In order to analyze these paired comparisons statistically, 
we apply a random utility model for paired comparisons 
[31], [32]. It is assumed that a subject assigns a utility U to 
the situation with and the situation without the link. The 
probability that the situation with a link is chosen over the 
situation without a link can then be written as 
Pr( | , , )
Pr(( ) ' ),
β
β ε ε
>
= − > −
link nolink link nolink
link nolink nolink link
U U z z
z z
 
where z is the vector of values for the independent variables 
with and without the link and β the vector of estimated 
coefficients. If we assume that the random terms are 
“independently and identically distributed with the type I 
extreme+value distribution” [33, p. 59], the probability that a 
subject chooses having the link over not having the link is 
given by 
( ) '
( ) '
Pr( | , , )
1
β
β
β
−
−
> =
+
link nolink
nolink link
z z
link nolink link nolink z z
e
U U z z
e
 
This corresponds to a binary logit model in which the 
independent variables are the differences between the two 
options; having the link and not having the link. Because our 
independent variables are differences between the two 
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situations (i.e., with and without the link), main effects of 
variables that do not vary between these situations (such as 
personal characteristics) are not identified.  
We run separate analyses for each experimental condition. 
Also, we take into account that the observations are nested. 
Decisions are nested within directed dyads, which are nested 
within decision makers, which are nested within sessions. In 
order to take this into account we run hierarchical four+level 
logistic regression models in which we estimate random 
intercepts at each level [34]. By focusing on one decision 
maker as explained above we neglect some dependence 
between observations. In particular, we neglect dependence 
related to the other subject in the dyad. Alternative 
specifications of the random effects did not change the 
results.  
Our dependent variable is whether or not a link is present 
after the evaluation moment. The three main independent 
variables that are part of the vector z indicated above are 
own outcome, efficiency, and inequality. Own outcome 
refers to the subject’s monetary payoff in a specific network. 
Efficiency we compute as the sum of outcomes for the 
others: 
i j
j i
Efficiency p
≠
= ∑ . 
We leave out the own outcome in the calculation of 
efficiency to achieve a clear distinction between self+interest 
and a concern for efficiency. For own outcome and 
efficiency we compute the natural logarithm of the 
differences between the situation with and without the link, 
because the distributions of these variables have long and 
thin tails.  
Finally, we operationalize equality: 
1 21 ( )
1
= − ⋅ −∑
=
N
Equality p p
iN i
, 
i.e., −1 times the standard deviation in outcomes in the 
group. The standard deviation provides a measure for 
inequality, and reversing it thus provides a measure for 
equality. We use the standard deviation because it has some 
naturally appealing qualities. First, it does not heavily rely on 
own payoffs of the subject. Some other measures do and 
because we want to avoid strong correlations between our 
variables we chose a calculation of equality that was not 
heavily dependent on own outcome. Second, the standard 
deviation increases more sharply if differences become 
higher. While in some cases this is a drawback, because it 
makes the standard deviation sensitive to outliers, we believe 
it is a positive aspect in our current study. It seems likely that 
subjects will not care too much about small differences in 
payoffs, independent of their motives, but these motives will 
be increasingly important if inequality increases. 
 Although we take care of the clustering of observations 
and we have chosen payoff functions in which all three 
utility arguments can hardly be optimized simultaneously, it 
is questionable whether our analysis can control for all path 
dependencies of the network formation process and the 
correlations between some of the independent variables. 
Therefore, we also ran a baseline simulation model in which 
actors myopically update their ties in order to maximize their 
payoff. Parameters in this simulation such as for payoffs and 
network size were chosen as in the experiment. Actors start 
from the empty network. On average one hundred times per 
actor in the network, a decision maker was randomly chosen 
to make a decision on one of his (also randomly chosen) ties. 
This decision maker decides whether or not to change the 
randomly chosen tie by comparing his own outcome in the 
situation with and without the tie. The agent decides based 
on his own myopic self+interest, while we add some normally 
distributed noise as well as a positive bias to stick to the 
change as we find it in the experiment (see below). The 
parameters for the amount of noise and bias are chosen to 
resemble the results that we find in the experiment. We ran 
160 simulated sessions per condition to reduce the standard 
errors for these baseline estimates compared to the estimates 
from the experiment. We varied network size in de 
simulations from 11 to 14. Finally, we analyzed the 
simulated data in exactly the same way as the experimental 
results to see whether we find effects of efficiency and 
equality even if we consider myopic actors who are only 
motivated by their own outcome. We discuss the results 
together with the experimental results below. 
 
V. RESULTS 
The experimental results are shown in Table I. First, we 
analyze the connections model with low cost (). A 
positive effect implies that a subject is more likely to prefer a 
network position in which the related independent variable 
has a higher value than in a network position in which this 
variable has a lower value, while we always compare 
networks with one link more or less. To control for whether 
subjects treat link removals differently from additions, we 
add the “creation of link” dummy and the constant. The 
constant indicates the likelihood that a subject recreates a 
link if the initial decision was to delete it. The “creation of 
link” dummy indicates the additional effect on the likelihood 
that a subject maintains a link if the initial decision was to 
create it. We see that subjects have a tendency to stick to the 
initial decision. The constant is negative indicating that if the 
initial decision was to remove a link there is a tendency not 
to recreate it. The “creation of link” effect is large and 
positive, indicating that if a link is created subjects have a 
tendency to maintain it. These effects are largely stable over 
analyses, and since they do not pertain to our hypotheses, 
they will not receive further attention.  
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We see that subjects are more likely to choose for links 
the more these links increases their own payoffs. Next to 
this, there is no evidence for the claim that subjects are more 
likely to create and maintain links the more these links 
increase efficiency, the effect of efficiency being 
insignificant. Contrary to our predictions, however, equality 
has a significant negative effect. This indicates that the more 
a link increases the equality in the network, the less likely it 
is to be created and maintained. From the simulation of 
purely myopic actors, we find small and positive effects for 
both efficiency and equality. The efficiency effect of the 
analysis shown is also not significantly different from the 
effect of the baseline model and the effect of equality is 
indeed a significant deviation from a model that assumes 
myopic actors in the opposite direction from our expectation. 
In the model for 		, we see that also in this 
condition subjects tend to create and maintain links that 
increase their own payoff, and decrease the equality in the 
network. Next to that, we now find that efficiency actually 
seems to have a negative significant impact on the creation 
and maintenance of links in the network. In the simulation, 
we again find small positive effects for efficiency as well as 
equality. So in both conditions we find support for 
hypothesis 1; subjects are found to be more likely to create 
and maintain links that increase their own outcomes in the 
network. Hypothesis 2 is not supported; efficiency seems to 
have no effect () or even a small negative effect 
(		 on the creation and maintenance of links in the 
network. Contrary to our expectations (hypothesis 3), 
subjects are more likely to create and maintain links that 
decrease equality. This contradicts the idea that in network 
formation subjects strive for equality. We should be careful, 
however, in interpreting the effect of equality as indicating 
that subjects try to attain inequality. Given past research in 
other decision making tasks, the argument that subjects strive 
for inequality seems unlikely. We should keep in mind that 
in our experiment own outcome, efficiency, and equality are 
all correlated in specific ways. In the theoretical section we 
discussed that if subjects would behave according to self+
interest, or self+interest combined with a concern for 
efficiency, they would jump at the opportunity to create links 
to well+connected others. Although our simulations show that 
the effect we find cannot be explained just by correlations 
between the variables if actors would strive purely for their 
own short+term interests, subjects might use more complex 
decision rules to determine their set of links than we have 
introduced in our model. Still, if the argument that subjects 
have a strong preference for networks that provide equal 
outcomes was correct, as has been suggested in past 
literature, we would expect that it would have trumped these 
other considerations. It did not, and therefore we can take 
our findings as reasonable arguments against a prominent 
role of a preference for equality in these network formation 
conditions.  
	 Now we turn to the co+author model. Similar to the 
situation in the connections model we find positive effects of 
own outcomes and a negative effects of equality. However, 
also in the simulations for the co+author models, we find 
negative effects of equality even if the actors just follow 
myopic self+interest. Therefore, these effects do not provide 
evidence that subjects in the experiment strive for inequality 
in outcomes. Contrary to the connections model, we find 
significant positive effects of efficiency on the creation and 
maintenance of links in the network. This provides support 
for hypotheses 1 and 2. It should be stressed that the effects 
of efficiency relative to own outcomes, next to being 
significant, are quite high in the co+author models. In the 
simulation, we also find positive effects of efficiency, but 
these are considerably smaller in size than the effects of the 
own outcomes. The relative effect of efficiency compared to 
own outcomes is therefore significantly larger in the 
experiment than in the simulation with myopic actors. A 
TABLE I 
HIERARCHICAL FOUR LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON THE PRESENCE OF A LINK AFTER AN EVALUATION MOMENT IN THE FOUR CONDITIONS 
  		  		
 coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
	
	       
     Creation of link 1.737***  .035 1.833***  .036  2.695***  .049 2.402*** .057 
     Constant + .482***  .034 +.760***  .038  +.316*  .132   .961** .368 
'
		         
     Own outcome  .487***  .012  .477***  .011   .792***  .052  .602***  .027 
     Efficiency  .014  .009 +.019*  .009   .506***  .057  .611***  .107 
     Equality +.073***  .011 +.062***  .010  +.078**  .025 +.060*  .024 

 
        
Session .035 .047 .000 .036 .119 .074 .000 .093 
Decision maker .181 .033 .231 .027 .487 .041 .279 .047 
Directed dyad .490 .032 .406 .034 .274 .059 .399 .055 
	         
Number of sessions 16 16 16 16 
Number of decision makers 205 205 202 200 
Number of directed dyads 3786 3678 2877 1898 
Number of decisions 21231 20012 14495 8865 
     
log likelihood +11246.73 +10483.859 +6960.8121 +4596.5602 
       * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two+sided test) 
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possible explanation is that subjects might use a more 
complex decision making protocol than we have assumed 
thus far. If subjects care about their long+term self+interest 
next to their short+term self+interest, this is likely to cause 
high estimates for efficiency in the co+author model. This is 
the case because in the co+author model efficiency coincides 
with long+term self+interest, and both these motives conflict 
with short+term self+interest. The relatively large effect of 
efficiency should thus not be purely interpreted as a concern 
for others, but rather as also containing a non+myopic 
concern for own outcomes. There again is no support for 
hypotheses 3: effects of equality are found to be similar to 
the simulation results with myopic actors. 
As indicated above, we had to make some assumptions 
before being able to perform the analyses described above. 
We now discuss some additional analyses we performed to 
investigate the robustness of our results. In all these 
robustness analyses, the positive effect related to own 
outcome is positive and highly significant. First, we 
investigated whether it mattered at what point in the 
experiment a specific condition was played. Remember that 
all subjects participated in all four conditions and that we 
varied the order of the conditions. Most effects are 
independent of the timing of the condition within the 
experiment, although the negative effect of equality is not 
consistently significant in the co+author model conditions. 
The most striking variation, however, is that the positive 
effect of efficiency in the co+author model conditions 
disappears when these conditions are the first in the 
experiment. This strengthens the story that the positive effect 
of efficiency found in the co+author model conditions might 
be due to long+term self+interest, assuming that subjects need 
some experience in order to be able to foresee what is in 
their long+term self+interest. In a first condition, it is much 
more likely that the subjects run into the social trap that 
exists in the co+author model and establish too many ties. 
Only after some experience they are able to avoid this social 
trap.  
Second, we investigated whether the length of the 
evaluation moment affected the results. Originally this length 
was set to be one second after the initial change; we 
investigated whether it mattered if we assumed an evaluation 
moment of 2, 3, 4, or 5 seconds respectively. It turns out that 
in the co+author conditions, the negative effect of equality 
loses significance if we lengthen the evaluation time. This is 
an additional indication that we should not interpret the 
negative effect of equality too strongly.  
Third, in the original model we assumed that if a link was 
kept the subject who initialized the actual change the crucial 
decision maker. We tried an alternative model in which the 
subject who earned the minimum payoff from the link was 
chosen as the crucial decision maker because this subject 
was the subject with the largest incentive to remove the link. 
Changing this assumption gives a positive effect of 
efficiency in both connections model conditions. Given that 
the payoff of the second decision maker in the link is part of 
the efficiency variable, we cannot rule out that this positive 
effect is due to a misspecification of the crucial decision 
maker. Finally, changing the assumption removes the 
negative effect of equality () or even returns a 
positive significant effect of equality (		) in to co+
author conditions. This strengthens again the claim that the 
negative effect of equality cannot be interpreted as support 
for the idea that subjects really strive for inequality. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
We investigated the role of social motives in network 
formation. Past laboratory experiments have indicated that 
subjects seem to care about efficiency, in terms of the sum of 
outcomes of the group as a whole, and equality when 
forming links in a network. We investigated whether subjects 
indeed apply these motives when deciding on links in a 
network and whether the behavior was stable over different 
contexts. 
As predicted, subjects were found to be more likely to 
create and maintain links that increase their own outcomes in 
the network. When it comes to efficiency and equality results 
are less clear. For efficiency we find no evidence that 
subjects care positively about efficiency in the connections 
model, while we find quite high estimates of the concern for 
efficiency in the co+author model. The findings that subjects 
are more likely to create and maintain links that decrease 
equality seem consistent over different contexts. Although 
we had put effort in disentangling the different motives, it 
cannot be completely ruled out that these findings might be a 
side effect of self+interested behavior of the subjects. Our 
simulation results show that this last explanation is a likely 
candidate for the co+author model conditions but less for the 
connections model conditions. Therefore, it might be that in 
these conditions competition plays a dominant role and that 
actors indeed are trying to outperform each other rather than 
just trying to optimize their own benefits. But also alternative 
explanations might be possible that involve more complex 
decision making than myopic best+reply behavior, for 
example, an overly simple decision heuristic to connect to 
well+connected others.  
In the co+author model conditions, short+term self+
interests conflict with efficiency, but also with long+term 
self+interests. Here, we observe that subjects are not more 
likely to create links that increase efficiency at the beginning 
of the experiment. This suggests that in these cases, the fact 
that links that increase efficiency are more likely to be 
formed in later parts of the experiment might be due to 
subjects learning to foresee what is in their long+term self+
interest instead of a concern for others. Therefore, it seems 
that our findings certainly for the co+author model can be 
reasonably explained by the assuming (non+myopic) self+
interest on the side of the subjects. 
So how can we explain that concerns for efficiency and 
inequality do not (or not in the predicted direction) play an 
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important role in network formation? A first explanation is 
the complexity of the situation. In a two+person setting, or 
the multi+person setting that is provided by a public good 
game, ones own choices have straightforward consequences 
for the others; either positive or negative. In a network this is 
not the case, which makes it more difficult for a person to 
assess whether a choice is in line with his or her personal 
motives. What should one do if one cares for others’ 
outcomes, but the outcomes for some others increases while 
that of others decreases? Or if one cares about equality but 
the equality between some increases while the inequality 
between others decreases? Such considerations are complex 
and might hamper the role of social motives in a network 
context. 
A second explanation for this finding is the responsibility+
alleviation effect [36]. This effect implies that if a person can 
shift the responsibility for an outcome to third parties he or 
she will be less likely to display pro+social behavior. As 
Charness states, this can be an important factor in a situation 
of “substantial personal interaction” (p. 375), of which 
networks are a natural example. In a network, a number of 
actors all influence the results. Even if a person would try to 
increase equality it is likely that the choices of others will 
undo this, either intentionally or unintentionally. Realizing 
this, actors will likely focus on their first interest, namely to 
achieve high outcomes for themselves. Evidence for the role 
of responsibility+alleviation can be seen in the finding that in 
the network formation experiment of [18] subjects only seem 
to dislike when they earn less than others, and not when they 
earn more than others. In two+person situations and simple 
multi+person situations such as the public good game, 
subjects tend to dislike inequality both if they earn less than 
others and if they earn more than others [10]. This indicates 
that in more complex situations pro+social motives decrease 
in importance, and self+interest dominates. 
In addition, we know from earlier research on social 
motives [23] that there are always some subjects who 
specifically strive for being better off than other subjects. 
Although the proportion of such subjects is mostly small 
even a few might cause a negative effect of equality if other 
subjects are not really striving for equality. Also concerning 
efficiency one might argue that subjects vary in the extent to 
which they care about this. To investigate these ideas further, 
we will extent our analyses in future research by also 
measuring at the individual level the extent to which subjects 
care about efficiency and equality. These measurements can 
be used to see whether the effects of efficiency and equality 
differ between different types of subjects. 
For the current paper we focused on micro+level decision. 
In the future, further attention should also be given to macro+
level outcomes. We found that our individual decisions can, 
for a large extent, be explained by self+interest. This brings 
about the question how this is reflected in our macro+level 
outcomes. Are the networks that are reached in our 
experiment more efficient and equal than what we would 
expect assuming self+interest, as was reported in past 
experiments? Or is the assumption of self+interest sufficient 
to explain our macro+level outcomes? An investigation of 
macro+level outcomes in our experiment is possible, but not 
unproblematic. When performing such investigations, past 
research focuses on the efficiency and equality of stable 
states reached in the experiment and compares these to the 
efficiency and equality in the predicted stable networks. In 
our experiment, possibly due to the large group sizes, we 
hardly ever achieve networks that are stable for multiple 
seconds. This implies that a different approach must be 
applied in order to compare the experimental data with 
theoretical predictions. Still, because we choose by design 
for a set+up with very few observations at the network level, 
we will not be able to establish much statistical evidence 
from our experiment on network level outcomes. 
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